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Abstract—In an attempt to support customization, many web 
applications allow the integration of third-party server-side 
plugins that offer diverse functionality, but also open an addi-
tional door for security vulnerabilities. In this paper we study 
the use of static code analysis tools to detect vulnerabilities in 
the plugins of the web application. The goal is twofold: 1) to 
study the effectiveness of static analysis on the detection of web 
application plugin vulnerabilities, and 2) to understand the 
potential impact of those plugins in the security of the core web 
application. We use two static code analyzers to evaluate a 
large number of plugins for a widely used Content Manage-
ment System. Results show that many plugins that are current-
ly deployed worldwide have dangerous Cross Site Scripting 
and SQL Injection vulnerabilities that can be easily exploited, 
and that even widely used static analysis tools may present 
disappointing vulnerability coverage and false positive rates. 
Keywords-Web applications; security; vulnerabilities; static 
analysis; plugins 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There is nowadays an increasing dependency on web ap-
plications. Ranging from individuals to large organizations, 
almost everything is stored, available or traded on the web. 
Web applications can be personal web sites, blogs, news, 
social networks, web mails, bank agencies, forums, e-
commerce applications, etc. The omnipresence of web appli-
cations in our way of life and in our economy is so important 
that they have turned into a natural target for malicious 
minds. 
To allow customization and thus fit the requirements of 
diverse scenarios, many web applications support the inte-
gration of server-side plugins that offer multiple functionali-
ties and may be provided by different parties. Well-known 
examples are Content Management Systems (CMSs) that 
allow individuals and/or communities of users to easily 
create and administrate web sites that publish a variety of 
contents. The sites created using CMSs can go from personal 
web pages and community portals to large corporate and e-
commerce applications. 
Although plugin-based web applications assure extensi-
bility and customizability, the possibility of integrating third-
party software opens an additional door for security vulnera-
bilities, regardless of the security assurance activities con-
ducted on top of the core application. In fact, other works 
show a predominance of security exploits due to vulnerabili-
ties in the external plugins, when compared to the core appli-
cation [5][22]. This is mostly due to the typically uncon-
trolled development processes and poor quality assurance 
activities applied during the development of such plugins, 
which are not able to prevent security vulnerabilities from 
being shipped into the field.  
Penetration testing and static analysis are examples of 
well-known techniques frequently used by web developers to 
identify security vulnerabilities in their code. Penetration 
testing consists in stressing the application from the point of 
view of an attacker (“black-box” approach) using specific 
malicious inputs. On the other hand, static analysis is a 
“white-box” approach based on the analysis of the source 
code of the application (without executing it) looking for 
potential vulnerabilities. A key difference between penetra-
tion testing and static analysis is that the first does not re-
quire access to the code while the second does. On the other 
hand, performing extensive testing may be unfeasible (e.g. 
due to the typically large number of plugins available and of 
potential configurations), whereas static analysis theoretical-
ly allows covering 100% of the code. For this reason, static 
analysis is frequently considered the most efficient way to 
detect vulnerabilities in web applications [1]. Trusting static 
analysis tools is thus of utmost importance when analyzing 
code that is used for vital processes or with an economic 
impact, in particular when security is the issue under discus-
sion. 
In this paper we study the use of static analysis tools to 
detect vulnerabilities in a plugin-based web application. In 
practice, the goal is to study two key questions: 
1. How effective are free static analysis tools detecting 
vulnerabilities in web application plugins? 
2. What is the real importance and impact of plugins in 
the security of a web application? 
To provide insights on these questions, this paper 
presents an experimental study in which we used two static 
analysis tools to detect security vulnerabilities in a compre-
hensive set of widely used plugins for a major player in the 
PHP CMS market. The static analyzers used are RIPS, a 
well-known tool for PHP source code analysis, and 
phpSAFE, a follow-up of a project whose development was 
requested by Automattic [3], the developer of WordPress, to 
improve the security of its plugins. The CMS considered is 
WordPress, which is used by millions of users around the 
world, and has a reported market share of approximately 
60%, among all CMSs available [38]. We analyzed 35 plu-
gins from the extremely large number of almost 30 thousand 
plugins available. The plugins have diverse characteristics 
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concerning the function they execute, the size of the code, 
the complexity, and the number of known downloads. 
Results show that plugins that are currently being used in 
thousands of WordPress installations have dangerous Cross 
Site Scripting (XSS) and SQL Injection (SQLi) vulnerabili-
ties. In fact, we disclosed more than 360 vulnerabilities in the 
plugins analyzed. Another observation is that RIPS presents 
disappointing results both in coverage and false positives. 
Compared to phpSAFE, RIPS detected 60% less vulnerabili-
ties. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. The next section 
introduces background concepts. Section III presents the 
experimental methodology used in the study. Section IV 
details the concept of static analysis in PHP applications and 
presents the static code analyzers used. Section V presents 
the results and discusses the lessons learned. Finally, Section 
VI concludes the paper. 
II. WEB SECURITY TESTING AND PLUGINS 
Previous works and practice suggest that external server-
side plugins are a major source of security vulnerabilities. 
For example, the field study presented in [22], which in-
cluded 312 real exploits used by hackers to attack web appli-
cations, shows the prevalence of security exploits that target 
the plugins (58%), when compared to the core application. 
Another relevant work is [5], which analyzed the security 
of the 50 most popular and 10 most popular e-commerce 
WordPress plugins. Besides XSS and SQLi, the vulnerabili-
ties considered include Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF), 
Remote/Local File Inclusion, and Path Traversal vulnerabili-
ties. The study reports vulnerabilities in 20% of the top 50 
plugins and in 70% of the e-commerce plugins. It also states 
that only six plugins fixed their vulnerabilities within six 
months after the vulnerabilities had been discovered. There 
are, however, questions about how the results were obtained 
that are not explained in the work presented in [5]. In fact, 
they do not detail the methodology and tools used, or even if 
they conducted any kind of manual analysis to confirm the 
vulnerabilities found. There is also a lack of detail about the 
vulnerabilities found, like the total number, false positives 
and negatives, and coverage. Our work addresses these ques-
tions. Furthermore, we also make use of plugins to under-
stand the effectiveness of two static code analyzers. 
A vulnerability is a weakness (an internal bug) that may 
be exploited to cause harm, although its presence does not 
cause harm by itself [25]. In practice, a vulnerability is a 
precondition for an attack (a malicious external fault) to 
cause an error and possibly subsequent failures [2]. Well-
known examples of dangerous vulnerabilities in web applica-
tions are XSS and SQLi. 
The search for common software bugs as well as for se-
curity problems can be grouped into white-box approaches 
(e.g., static analysis), black-box approaches (e.g., penetration 
testing) and a blend of both (gray-box). White-box consists 
of source code analysis (inspection or static analysis). It 
uncovers security problems by looking at the code of the 
application without executing it, so it has no run-time over-
head and it may virtually achieve 100% code coverage, as it 
is able to analyze all the possible execution paths (unlike 
testing in which code coverage is a well-known problem). It 
also has the advantage of being applicable early in the soft-
ware development lifecycle, even when only part of the code 
is available. Common problems are the high number of false 
positives (safe code constructs that are seen as vulnerable by 
the detection mechanism) and false negatives (vulnerable 
code that is seen as safe). White-box analysis is considered 
by many as the most efficient way to locate vulnerabilities in 
a web application [1]. For example, at Microsoft it is be-
lieved that code review is around 20 to 30 times more effec-
tive in finding bugs than software testing [25] and it can 
uncover around half of the existing bugs when applied the 
most adequate manner [4]. 
III. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY 
In this section we propose a methodology for the detec-
tion of security vulnerabilities in the code of PHP web appli-
cation plugins using static analysis. We first present the 
generic process, and then focus on introducing the types of 
vulnerabilities addressed, the target web application, and the 
plugins analyzed. 
A. Overall process 
The process proposed is based on a set of straightforward 
phases and steps: 
1. Preparation of the experiments: create the conditions 
for running the static analyzers on top of relevant plugins. 
Two steps are needed: 
a. Identify a representative web application that allows 
the integration of plugins, and select a large set of 
widely used plugins for that application; 
b. Decide on the types of vulnerabilities to be the target 
of the study and select representative static analyzers 
able to detect those vulnerabilities; 
2.  Execution of the static code analyzers: analyze the 
plugins using the tools. This includes two steps, whose 
results are later processed and compared:   
a. Perform a generic analysis of the plugins using the 
typical configuration of the analyzers, i.e. not taking 
into account the fact that the target files are plugins 
for a specific web application;  
b. Run a targeted analysis in which the configuration of 
the analyzers is tuned for the specific context of the 
target web application; 
The correlation of the results from these two steps al-
lows studying the performance of the static code analyz-
ers in detecting vulnerabilities when they are configured 
for the specific context of the web application plugins 
and when not, with respect to two key figures of merit: 
coverage and false positives. This may give insights to 
how these tools should evolve in the future, e.g. helping 
to understand whether the tools should be explicitly pre-
pared to handle the analysis of plugins or just need to 
follow a more generic approach. 
3. Analysis of the results: collect the reports of the tools 
and process the information gathered. This includes two 
steps: 
a. Manual verification of the vulnerabilities reported to 
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confirm the true vulnerabilities and discard the false 
positives; 
b. Analysis of data to understand the impact of plugins 
in the application security and study the relative effec-
tiveness, strengths and weaknesses, of the static ana-
lyzer tools. 
B. Chosen web vulnerabilities 
The list of types of vulnerabilities affecting web applica-
tions is enormous, but XSS and SQLi are at the top of that 
list, accounting for 32% of the vulnerabilities observed 
[36][34]. Other studies also found XSS and SQLi as the most 
prevalent [33][18][40]. Figure 1 depicts the yearly percen-
tage of disclosed XSS and SQLi among all the causes of web 
application vulnerabilities, showing that they have been 
increasing over time [37]. Many referenced works, such as 
[34][27][7], have discussed details about the most common 
vulnerabilities, along with the reasons of their existence, 
attacks, best practices to avoid, detect and mitigate them. 
A XSS attack consists of a malicious injection of HTML 
and/or other scripting code (frequently Javascript) in a vul-
nerable web page. Many web applications are built in a way 
that they use the values supplied by users directly in the 
HTML displayed in the web browser. Without being proper-
ly sanitized, this input can be crafted to change the contents 
of the web page displayed to the victim, therefore giving the 
attacker control. In practice, by tweaking the input, the at-
tacker is able to change how the web application executes 
some of its functions, allowing him to take advantage of 
users visiting that web page in the future. Note that this input 
may come from a text field, but also from a file, a database 
record or from another application. XSS attacks exploit the 
users’ (victims) trust of a web site, allowing the attacker to 
impersonate them and even execute other types of attacks 
such as CSRF. The injection of XSS can also be persistent if 
the malicious input is stored in the back-end database of the 
web application. This way it can affect every user that visits 
a web page built from this data, therefore potentiating dra-
matically the malicious effects of the attack. 
SQLi attacks take advantage of unchecked input fields in 
the web application interface to maliciously tweak the SQL 
query sent to the back-end database. This allows the attacker 
to retrieve sensible data or even alter database records. An 
SQLi attack can be dormant for a while and only be triggered 
by a specific event, such as the periodic execution of some 
procedures in the database (e.g., the scheduled database 
cleaning function). SQLi attacks may also allow privileged 
access to the back-end server and to the inner network of the 
enterprise, free of the typical firewall and IDS/IPS barriers. 
In practice, XSS and SQLi vulnerabilities open the door 
for attackers to access unauthorized data (read, insert, change 
or delete), gain access to privileged database accounts, im-
personate other users (such as the administrator), mimic web 
applications, deface web pages, view and manipulate remote 
files on the server, inject and execute server side programs 
that allow the creation of botnets controlled by the attacker, 
etc. Due to the prevalence and the severity of the attacks that 
exploit these two important vulnerabilities (XSS and SQLi), 
we have chosen them as the target of our study. 
C. Target web application 
The information digitally available on the web and stored 
in back-end databases (the so-called hidden web) is rapidly 
increasing. In the last three years, from November 2010 to 
November 2013, the number of web sites grew 212% to 780 
million [30]. CMS applications are used by 35% of the web, 
according to W3Techs [38] and they are normally built on 
top of third-party plugins. Such large utilization justifies the 
focus of our work about this type of web application. 
The Top 5 CMS used nowadays is presented in TABLE 
I. WordPress is the most widely used CMS, supporting the 
creation of web sites like TED, NBC, CNN, The New York 
Times, Forbes, eBay, Best Buy, Sony, TechCrunch, UPS, 
National Football League, CBS Radio, etc. [12]. There are 
over 72 million WordPress sites, which is 9% of the web. 
Over 400 million people view more than 14 billion pages 
each month, some of these users produce about 36 million 
new posts and 63 million new comments each month. 
WordPress has, currently, 28 thousand plugins that have 
been downloaded over 550 million times [12]. In an ecosys-
tem so widespread, any security breach may have a signifi-
cant impact on a huge number of users, enterprises and their 
overall business. 
WordPress is developed in PHP (a dynamically-typed 
language used by 81.4% of all web sites [39]). A key aspect 
is that, in the last years, it has been absent from significant 
attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in the core application. 
However, the same cannot be said about its third-party plu-
gins, as seen in recent events where the vulnerabilities in just 
four plugins may have affected over 3.5 million blog sites 
and many more of their users [13][16][11][9]. 
D. Plugins selection 
Having decided that the core web application was 
WordPress, we selected a set of 35 plugins, a reasonable 
number that allowed both the execution of the experiments, 
including a manual analysis of all the vulnerabilities reported 
by the static analysis tools, and that could be representative 
enough to obtain meaningful results. In practice, the reason-
ing behind the selection of the plugins was to include a very 
Figure 1. Evolution of disclosed reports of SQLi and XSS [37] 
TABLE I. TOP 5 CMS  [38] 
CMS CMS market share Language OOP
WordPress 59.4% PHP V
Joomla 9.3% PHP V
Drupal 5.6% PHP X
Blogger 3.4% Java V












































diverse set. In order to not bias the study, we did not study 
the vulnerability proneness of these plugins beforehand. 
The list of the 35 WordPress plugins selected is presented 
in TABLE II. Overall, these plugins have been downloaded 
over 11 million times and have an average rating of 4.1 out 
of 5 stars among WordPress users. These plugins are imple-
mented in a total of 225 PHP files (that were analyzed) and 
they have more than 86 thousand lines of code. The list of 
plugins is varied, in what regards the function they execute, 
the size of the code, the complexity, and the number of 
downloads.  
IV. PHP STATIC ANALYSIS 
In this section we detail the concept of static analysis for 
security (in particular, taint analysis), introduce the RIPS and 
phpSAFE tools used in our study, and discuss some of the 
known limitations of this type of 
security tools.  
To perform the static analysis, 
the tool receives a source code file 
as input (Figure 2). Next it adds the 
other files that are referred by the 
original source file as included files. 
With this data, it builds a syntax tree 
model representing the code, which 
is analyzed based on a body of 
knowledge about security vulnera-
bilities. The list of vulnerabilities 
discovered is finally presented to the 
user. 
To obtain the syntax tree model 
for the specific case of PHP applica-
tions there is a handy PHP function 
called token_get_all. It parses 
a PHP file and builds an array with 
the PHP tokens [14]. Based on this 
function there is an API that simpli-
fies the static code analysis by build-
ing a syntax tree more complete and, 
to some extent, easier to work with 
[17]. However, both RIPS and 
phpSAFE still use directly the to-
ken_get_all to build the parse 
tree model. The reason is that they 
need to perform a series of low-level 
manipulations very fast, which 
makes the higher level API less 
interesting to use. 
A. Taint analysis for vulnerability 
detection 
The typical approach to find in-
put validation bugs is using taint 
analysis [4][35][6][28], which is also 
a feature of some languages, like 
Perl and Ruby. In fact, it first ap-
peared in Perl, allowing the detec-
tion of attacks at runtime by running 
the Perl scripts with taintperl 
instead of perl [29]. Taint analysis is well suited for the 
input validation class of vulnerabilities, like XSS and SQLi, 
as it follows the path of input variables, which are also the 
input vectors of the attacks that exploit these vulnerabilities. 
In taint analysis the data that comes from an uncontrolled 
TABLE II. WORDPRESS PLUGIN SUMMARY DATA 
Plugin Category Downloads Rate Files LOC OOP 
all-in-one-webmaster v8.2.3 Webmaster  513,234 4.5 1 416
calendar v1.3.2 Calendar  439,957 3.9 1 3,050
content-slide v1.4.2 Image  206,833 4.5 3 499
contextual-related-posts 
v1.8.6 Content management  309,111 4.3 3 1,157
digg-digg v5.3.4 Social media  782,548 3.5 13 5,437 6
easy-adsense-lite v6.06 Advertising  289,838 3.3 8 1,128
events-manager v5.3.8 Events  777,260 4.3 17 5,135 2
external-video-for-everybody 
v2.0 Video  8,247 4.0 1 394
feedweb v1.8.8 Feedback  57,706 4.7 12 4,793
foursquare-checkins v1.2 Checkin  1,688 5.0 1 232
funcaptcha v0.3.7 Captcha  11,684 4.6 4 1,314 8
ga-universal v1.0 Webmaster  275 1 136
jaspreetchahals-coupons-lite 
v2.1 e-commerce  7,082 4.9 3 1,189
18
login-with-ajax v3.0.4 Login  227,040 4.4 4 906 2
mail-subscribe-list v2.0.9 Mail  59,553 4.6 1 144
mathjax-latex v1.1 Content management  6,075 4.6 1 404
montezuma v1.1.7 Webmaster   513,246 4.5 7 502
newsletter v3.2.7 Newsletter   815,291 4.6 3 1,288 1
occasions v1.0.4 Content management  3,334 3.0 2 755
paypal-digital-goods-
monetization-powered-by-
cleeng v2.2.13 e-commerce  6,807 3.7 3 522
qtranslate v2.5.34 Localization  978,012 3.7 9 4,337
securimage-wp v3.2.7 Captcha  3,158 2.3 2 997
simply-poll v1.4.1 Poll  20,795 3.2 6 847
social-media-widget v4.0.1 Social media  1,181,508 4.1 1 1077
syntaxhighlighter v3.1.5 Content management  310,490 4.4 1 1257
top-10 v1.9.2 Content management  126,923 4.3 5 891
trafficanalyzer v3.3.2 Webmaster   14,676 3.4 22 4,684 5
underconstruction v1.08 Content management  473,311 4.9 3 754 1
user-role-editor v3.12 User Management  901,598 4.2 2 545
videojs-html5-video-player-
for-wordpress v3.2.3 Video  105,561 4.3 2 388
wordpress-simple-paypal-
shopping-cart v3.5 e-commerce  343,249 4.3 1 16
wp-photo-album-plus v5.0.2 Image  852,578 4.3 31 12,339
wp-symposium v13.02 Social media  115,112 4.0 44 23,173
wp125 v1.4.9 Advertising  435,757 4.2 4 547
xili-language v2.8.4 Localization  107,070 4.2 3 5,090
 Total 11,006,607 225 86,343 43
 Average 314,474.5 4.1 6.4 2,466.9 8.6
LOC – Lines of Code  
Figure 2. Static analysis tool block diagram, adapted from [35]
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environment (i.e., input data that may be malicious) is 
tainted. When a tainted variable is used by the application in 
some sensitive way an attack becomes possible. In a con-
servative approach every input that comes directly from the 
outside is considered to come from an uncontrolled and 
unsafe environment; whether it is from a user input, a file, 
the database, or the return of a function that is not imple-
mented locally in the code (in the configuration of the static 
code analyzer tool). This tainted data may propagate to other 
program variables, making them also tainted. The variables 
may, however, become untainted through a set of operations 
that depend on the nature of the data and how they are going 
to be used. That is, this untainting process is dependent on 
the vulnerability type. 
To clarify the idea, let’s consider an example of different 
ways to sanitize (untaint) data in the context of multiple 
types of vulnerabilities. Assume then an input variable that is 
tainted. If this variable is going to be used in a MySQL data-
base query we may want to make it safe against SQLi attacks 
and thus use the PHP function 
mysql_real_escape_string. This sanitizes the vari-
able for SQLi but not for other kind of vulnerabilities, like 
XSS. On the other hand, if that variable is to be displayed in 
the web browser, we may want to make that variable safe for 
XSS attacks by using the PHP function htmlentities. 
This sanitizes the variable for XSS but not for other kind of 
vulnerabilities, like SQLi. There are, however, situations 
where the sanitization process makes the variable untainted 
for all (or several) vulnerabilities at once. For example, if the 
tainted variable is supposed to store an integer value, we 
have to take into consideration that PHP is a weakly typed 
programming language so it does not enforce the type check-
ing of the variables. The sanitization function in this case 
may be the intval function, which allows untainting the 
variable for both XSS and SQLi, since it guarantees that only 
a numeric value can be stored in the variable (if a text is 
inputted it returns 0, which is also a number). 
B. RIPS static code analyzer tool 
RIPS is a static source code analyzer for vulnerabilities in 
PHP scripts, developed by Johannes Dahse [20]. RIPS is a 
well-known PHP free source code analysis tool that has been 
around since May 2010 and is being continuously improved. 
It was developed in PHP and has a comprehensive user inter-
face. Its vulnerability detection mechanism is complemented 
by an integrated code audit framework that allows further 
manual analysis. These features make it very easy to explore 
the path of the tainted variables. RIPS is able to detect XSS, 
SQLi, HTTP Response Splitting, Code Execution, File In-
clusion, File Disclosure, File Manipulation, Command Ex-
ecution, XPath Injection, LDAP Injection, Header Injection, 
and Possible Flow Control vulnerabilities. However, the 
current version of RIPS, which is 0.54, does not support 
Object Oriented Programming (OOP). 
RIPS includes three main configuration files devoted to 
the PHP tokens, which are used during the static analysis. 
Although RIPS is deployed with a default configuration, it is 
in these files that the user can configure the entry points 
where the tainted variables are generated, how they can be 
considered untainted and how their use may turn into a po-
tential vulnerability.  
a) sources.php: contains the inputs of variables 
that are considered as potentially unsecure. This is com-
posed by PHP variables (like $_GET and 
$HTTP_COOKIE_VARS), server parameters (like 
HTTP_ACCEPT and PHP_SELF), PHP file functions  (like 
fgets  and fread), and database manipulation functions 
(like mysql_fetch_array and mysql_fetch_row). 
b) securing.php: defines the PHP functions that 
can be used to untaint the variables. These functions change 
the values of their parameters so that they become safe to 
use when they are returned to the caller. Some of these func-
tions are generic (like intval and md5), while others are 
specific to a given vulnerability (like htmlentities for 
XSS and mysql_real_escape_string for SQLi, as 
explained previously). 
c) sinks.php: contains the PHP functions or lan-
guage constructs that may be exploited by an attacker. They 
are specific to a given vulnerability and are affected by 
variables manipulated to take advantage of that vulnerability 
(like echo for XSS and mysql_query for SQLi). 
C. phpSAFE static code analyzer tool 
phpSAFE is a static source code analyzer for XSS and 
SQLi vulnerabilities in PHP scripts, currently under devel-
opment by the authors of this paper [23]. It is a follow-up of 
a project proposed by Automattic [3] in an effort to improve 
the security of WordPress plugins, as well as PHP based web 
applications. The interface of phpSAFE is very simple and 
not as complete as the RIPS one. The tool was designed to 
facilitate the integration with other projects as a PHP class 
that can be included to search for vulnerabilities. phpSAFE 
performs a number of tasks: obtains vulnerable variables, 
output variables and other variables; functions used by the 
target code, other PHP files included or required, the com-
plete list of tokens (the tree model of the PHP files) and 
finally debug information. This data can be very useful in 
helping security practitioners trace back the path of the 
tainted variables since they entered the system. 
The configuration of phpSAFE, as far as the input, the 
output, and the sanitization of the variables, is based on the 
data contained on the RIPS configuration files. However, 
phpSAFE also includes specific configurations for the analy-
sis of WordPress plugins (using data source and securing 
functions gathered from various resources, like [19] and 
[14]). Furthermore, phpSAFE has the advantage of being 
prepared to deal with OOP, unlike RIPS. This is a major 
highlight because many of the current CMS platforms with a 
very large community of users are developed using OOP 
(TABLE I). Implementing OOP in a static code analyzer is 
not a trivial matter, because of the complexity needed to deal 
with the multiple ways variables and methods can be used, 
the scope of variables, arrays, object instantiation, etc. 
D. Known limitations of static analysis tools 
A key limitation of static analysis tools has to do with the 
difficulty in implementing the analysis of dynamic code. For 
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example, in PHP this may come in the form of dynamic 
inclusions, such as when the name of the file to be included 
is stored in a variable, or the variable name is itself stored in 
another variable, for example:  
$include_file=$_POST[ 'file' ]; 
require_once($include_file); 
Moreover, existing tools are not ready to parse Javascript 
embedded code. They are also not prepared for logical or 
architectural vulnerabilities, whose detection is very difficult 
to automate. In fact, this is currently mainly addressed by 
manual analysis, usually with help of tools, like the Micro-
soft Threat Modeling Tool [25]. 
In addition to PHP specific functions, web application 
plugins rely on functions and variables provided by the core 
application to get data and to manipulate variables. For ex-
ample, in the case of WordPress, an input variable may come 
from the $wpdb->get_results method, it may be sani-
tized using the esc_html function and may be used in the 
output through the $wpdb->query method [15][10]. 
As RIPS is a generic PHP static code analyzer, it is not 
configured by default to deal with specific application plu-
gins. Therefore, running step b of the second phase of the 
experimental process, the target analysis, (see Section III.A) 
requires adding WordPress related functions to the RIPS 
sources.php and securing.php configuration files. 
On the other hand, phpSAFE is by default configured for 
WordPress. 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This section presents and discusses the results of our 
study within the perspective of the two key questions we are 
addressing. First we analyze the performance of the static 
analysis tools. Afterwards we analyze the impact of plugins 
in the application security through a detailed analysis of the 
vulnerabilities found by both tools. Finally, we discuss the 
lessons learned and the limitations of the study. 
A. Tool detection effectiveness 
The effectiveness of the tools is assessed in two steps: the 
first consists of running each static code analyzer with base 
configurations for generic XSS and SQLi vulnerabilities, and 
the second consists of tuning those tools for the specific 
context of WordPress plugins. The aim is to understand 
whether the effectiveness of the vulnerability detection in 
plugins improves (or not) by having the tools configured for 
the specificities of the core application. 
It is well known that automated security tools typically 
originate a high number of false alarms (false positives), so 
we performed a manual verification of all the results pro-
vided by both RIPS and phpSAFE, in both steps of the 
second phase of the experimental process (see Section III.A). 
This important process, which is very labor intensive and 
time consuming, allowed us to classify 139 of the 495 situa-
tions pointed by the tools as not being real vulnerabilities 
(28.1% false positives). 
Due to the unfeasibly large amount of work, we did not 
manually analyze all the target source code files looking for 
vulnerabilities missed by the tools. Therefore, to obtain the 
coverage data we combined all the true vulnerabilities found 
by both tools, despite knowing that there could be some left 
undetected. This will give an optimistic view of the coverage 
rates of the tools, which is a best effort result that may be 
improved using more tools and a thorough manual review of 
the code using well established procedures, like the ESA 
Guide for Independent Software Verification and Validation 
[8] or the 1012-2004 IEEE Standard for Software Verifica-
tion and Validation [19]. The overall results regarding detec-
tion coverage when the tools were configured for the 
WordPress are depicted in TABLE III. As can be seen, 
phpSAFE presents better overall results than RIPS. 
During the experiments we observed that phpSAFE was 
unable to analyze five files (2% of the files) from the set of 
plugins due to an implementation defect of the current ver-
sion related to an infinite loop. This problem happens when a 
file has many included files and becomes too complex. To 
compare the detection capabilities of both tools we discarded 
these five files. From a sample analysis of the discarded 
vulnerabilities (as reported by RIPS), we verified that most 
of them where already detected when the included files were 
analyzed by the tools individually, which minimizes the 
impact of not considering such vulnerabilities. 
During the study, only phpSAFE was able to detect SQLi 
vulnerabilities (i.e., RIPS did not report any vulnerabilities of 
this type). It detected 10 vulnerabilities, from which 2 were 
considered false positives after the manual analysis (see 
TABLE IV). As SQLi data represents as little as 2% of all 
the vulnerabilities found, in the following subsections we 
focus on the detection of XSS data. 
a) Generic analysis 
As mentioned before, we first configured the two tools 
for generic PHP vulnerabilities, by leaving the RIPS default 
setup untouched and removing the WordPress configuration 
features from phpSAFE. The results of running the tools 
with such configuration are summarized in TABLE V. As 
shown, the two tools detected correctly a similar number of 
vulnerabilities, although RIPS is not prepared for OOP and 
some plugins are developed in OOP (43 source code files). 
In fact, the presence of OOP in some of the target files may 
mislead the RIPS detection mechanism. This may justify the 
reason why this tool presents a false positives rate higher 
than phpSAFE. 
Another important question that should be analyzed is the 
overlap of the output of the tools: do the tools detect the 
same vulnerabilities or should we use several tools to im-
TABLE III. TOOLS OVERALL VULNERABILITY DETECTION 
Vulnerabilities Total RIPS phpSAFE
# 356 135 316
% 100% 37.9% 88.8%







RIPS 0 0 -
phpSAFE 8 2 80%







RIPS 135 81 62.5%
phpSAFE 131 46 74.0%
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prove the global coverage? This is addressed in Figure 3 that 
shows a Venn diagram where the radius of each circle is 
proportional to the number of vulnerabilities, providing a 
comparative visual image of the coverage of each tool. Over-
all the tools detected 180 distinct vulnerabilities. In the dia-
gram we can see a fair amount of the same vulnerabilities 
detected by both tools, which are represented by the intersec-
tion of the circles. There are around half of such vulnerabili-
ties (86 out of 180). Each tool detected many vulnerabilities 
that the other did not (45 and 49, respectively for phpSAFE 
and RIPS), confirming the well-known idea that there is no 
silver bullet, as also stated by other studies [21]. 
b) Targeted analysis 
As a second step we tuned both tools to include the anal-
ysis of WordPress related variable input sanitization. The 
results are summarized in TABLE VI. As shown, RIPS de-
tected the same vulnerabilities as in the first step (i.e., with-
out tuning). This is due to the fact that WordPress is built 
using OOP, so the input and sanitization functions are based 
on class methods and they were used in the new configura-
tion. Since RIPS is not prepared for OOP it is natural that it 
may not be able to use the new set of configuration parame-
ters properly. On the other hand, as phpSAFE is prepared for 
OOP, there is a huge improvement in the results. In fact, it 
was able to detect correctly more than twice the number of 
vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the overlap of vulnerabilities 
reported by the two tools, presented in the Venn diagram of 
Figure 4, shows that phpSAFE was even able to detect six 
more vulnerabilities that RIPS also found in the first step of 
the experimental process. We found that these situations 
have to do with OOP methods that, although RIPS is not 
prepared to deal with, were pointed as vulnerabilities. On the 
other side, phpSAFE was able to detect them only when 
configured to deal with WordPress specificities. 
B. Plugin impact analysis 
From the aggregated results of the test of the 35 
WordPress plugins by the two static code analysis tools, we 
obtained 348 XSS and 8 SQLi true vulnerabilities. To the 
best of our knowledge, these were previously unknown vul-
nerabilities that are being disclosed to the public for the first 
time in this paper. Due to false positives, they were con-
firmed by a subsequent manual analysis. This data is shown 
in TABLE VII and represents an average of more than 10 
vulnerabilities per plugin. The vulnerabilities were found in 
20 plugins, which is 57% of all the plugins analyzed. On 
average, each vulnerable plugin has 17.8 vulnerabilities, 
which corresponds to one vulnerability for each 207 lines of 
code. 
PHP is a weak typed programming language, which 
means that any variable may contain data from any type. 
Although this gives a lot of flexibility, it also poses serious 
security problems when not used properly. Almost half 
(41%) of the vulnerable variables are used to store numeric 
values, but they have no restriction about what values they 
may store. This is inline with findings from other studies that 
found 45% of numeric variables in the vulnerability fixes 
done by developers [23]. These variables open the door for 
attackers to use them to freely carry the exploitation text. In a 
SQLi attack the attacker may change the query and in a XSS 
he may change the structure of the page. These situations are 
usually easier to exploit than a text variable, because num-
bers are not usually enclosed by quotes or double quotes, 
which need to be overcome by the attacker. The ease of 
exploitation of numeric variables may also explain why they 
are extensively targeted by attackers [30]. An interesting 
aspect is that they are very easy to fix: in PHP this can be 
done using $var = intval($var); or $var = (int)$var; 
after $var received the value from the outside. 
We also found that the number of distinct variables that 
are vulnerable is only 127, which averages a variable reuse 
of 2.8 times. The largest number of times a single variable 
name was used in the plugins was 24 times. The reuse of 
variables in consecutive exploitation by hackers is also a 
common situation [22]. In those cases the developer fre-
quently protects one instance and forgets the others, allowing 
the attacker to use a similar exploit to take advantage of the 
use of the same variable elsewhere. The variable reuse also 
means that a single fix at the origin of the variable is likely to 
solve several vulnerabilities at once. Since there was only a 
few SQLi, all the reutilization occurred in XSS and convert-
ing the values that come from the outside to HTML entities 
(for example, convert > to &gt;) as soon as possible is a best 
practice that should be followed by practitioners. 
To better understand the source of the vulnerabilities, we 
made an extensive analysis on how such data is stored in the 
variables and used by the plugins. We observed that the 
sources of data might be classified in the following types, 
regarding the apparent ease of exploitation: 
 
Figure 3. phpSAFE and RIPS configured for generic XSS detection 
 







RIPS 135 81 62.5%
phpSAFE 305 63 82.9%
Figure 4. phpSAFE and RIPS adapted for WordPress XSS detection 
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1. Likely to be directly manipulated by users, through 
POST, GET or COOKIES. These types of vulnerabili-
ties are usually targeted by occasional hackers and script 
kiddies, but are also massively exploited [22]. From a 
cost/benefit perspective of the attacker the question is: 
why try to find a vulnerability difficult to exploit when 
there are so many low hanging fruits out there? We 
found 138 of such vulnerabilities, all of them XSS, 
which represent 39% of the vulnerabilities detected. It 
was a surprise to find so many of these vulnerabilities, 
since they are very easy to spot by the developer (and 
the attacker), specifically those where the input is used 
directly as output, without passing through any other va-
riable. These vulnerabilities are easy to exploit because 
the attacker only has to manipulate the form fields in the 
application interface, the URL, use specific tools like 
proxies (e.g., Paros, WebScarab), web browser plugins 
(e.g., Cookie Manager, Cookie Editor) or even frame-
works like the Metaspoit. Moreover, all of these tools 
(and many others) can be found organized, integrated 
and ready to be used in Linux distributions like Kali. To 
illustrate this type, let’s consider the following example 
adapted from wp-symposium plugin: 
<input type="hidden" name="redirect_to" val-
ue="<?php echo $_GET['u']; ?>" /> 
We can observe the direct use of the input, without any 
sanitization, clearly showing a XSS vulnerability. To 
successfully exploit it, before the payload, the attacker 
only has to close the double quote and the input tag with 
">playload. 
2. Indirectly manipulated by users, but they have an 
easy access to them, like the database. Database val-
ues are easily altered by the interface of the application 
that was specifically developed for that function. Many 
times what is stored in the database is only free of SQLi 
(using prepared statements, for example) so it cannot al-
ter the query executed; but it is often forgotten that the 
information stored will eventually be used by other parts 
of the application and that this may also be exploited. 
One common case is XSS, where the SQLi filters have 
no effect on what can be used to change the structure of 
the web page. This kind of exploitation has the ability to 
be permanent and to affect many users of the application 
because every time a page uses the information stored, 
the attack is executed and that user becomes another vic-
tim. We found 211 of such cases, which represent 59% 
of our data. This value is not larger because sometimes 
the database query only returns a number (an ID, a count 
or a sum), which cannot be used to exploit (at least from 
a non convoluted way). Looking at the code, it was rare 
to find a plugin developed with concerns about the qual-
ity of the information that comes from the database. In 
complex systems with many users, built around COTS 
that come from different places, that have no previous 
validation and anyone can freely use, we cannot have a 






Origin of the Vulnerable Input Indirect 
Output XSS SQLi POST GET POST/GET/COOKIE DB File Function Array




v1.8.6 2 2 2  
digg-digg v5.3.4 6 4 3 3  3
easy-adsense-lite v6.06 2 1 2  
events-manager v5.3.8 30 2 14 1
1
6 6 7  19
feedweb v1.8.8 9 1 3 5 1 6 2 1 3
funcaptcha v0.3.7 8 2 8  
jaspreetchahals-coupons-
lite v2.1 32 14 4 1
3
1  14
login-with-ajax v3.0.4 2 2 2  
mail-subscribe-list v2.0.9 5 1 2 3 1 2 3  
newsletter v3.2.7 2 1 1 2 2 1  2
paypal-digital-goods-
monetization-powered-
by-cleeng v2.2.13 6 2 5 7 6 2   5
qtranslate v2.5.34 26 1 5 16 5 11 5 1 1 5 1 9
securimage-wp v3.2.7 2 1 2   
trafficanalyzer v3.3.2 3 2 3 1 2 2   
underconstruction v1.08 1 1 1   
videojs-html5-video-
player-for-wordpress 
v3.2.3 1 1   
wp-photo-album-plus 
v5.0.2 64 44 16 2 28 34 1  4
wp-symposium v13.02 102 54 30 3 12 1 86   6
wp125 v1.4.9 21 7 5 3 18   3
Total 348 8 147 127 22 96 20 211 2 6 1 69
Average 17.4 0.4 7.35 6.35 1.1 4.8 1 10.55 0.1 0.3 0.05 3.45
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guarantee that what is stored in the database is clean and 
safe to use. For such reasons, the output from the data-
base should be treated as potentially evil, as any direct 
input.  To illustrate this type, let’s consider the following 
example adapted from wp-photo-album-plus plugin: 
$image = $wpdb->get_var( 
$wpdb->prepare("SELECT %s FROM ...")); 
echo stripslashes($image); 
We can observe concerns about preventing SQLi, but 
not about XSS, since the stripslashes does not prevent 
this type of problems. 
3. Unlikely to be easily manipulated, like operating sys-
tem files, the core application or plugin functions and 
other variables like arrays. Although these situations 
may be less prone to attacks due to the increased diffi-
culty in taking advantage of them, we have seen ad-
vanced attacks using them, specially file manipulation 
[22]. Also, previous considerations about the quality of 
the plugins should advise developers to not trust the 
output of functions that come from the outside. Even 
when not intended to cause harm, sometimes they do, 
like the case of two security plugins that allowed attacks 
to be performed due to bugs in their code [22]. To illu-
strate this type, let’s consider the following example 
adapted from qtranslate plugin: 
$res = fgets($fp, 128); 
echo $res; 
We can observe the direct use of the content of the file, 
without any sanitization, clearly showing a XSS vulne-
rability. To successfully exploit it, the attacker has to be 
able to either change the content of the file or change the 
chosen file to one he controls. 
During code review, some situations may mislead the re-
viewer into thinking the variable is safe when it is not. This 
may occur because of the complexity of the code, the diffi-
culty on following the flux of the variable, or because the 
variable is passed as argument of functions and the final 
variable seems to be completely different from the original. 
One such situation that may give the code reviewer a false 
sense of security occurs when the variable seems to disap-
pear inside a function when it is one of the arguments (that 
may also be defined in other source code files), when its 
value is just assigned to another variable returned by the 
function. From our data, we accounted for 69 of such situa-
tions and we displayed them in the column Indirect Output in 
TABLE VII. 
Taking into consideration the entry point of the attack we 
can argue that many vulnerabilities may not be exploited if 
the attacker is unable to manipulate the files, the return of 
WordPress functions or the database. That is, if other protec-
tion mechanisms in place prevent these actions from occur-
ring, the vulnerabilities would be instead “just” code that did 
not follow best coding practices, but without presenting a 
direct real danger. This can, however, change dramatically if 
the previous assumptions do not hold, either by a new bug 
discovered, a change in the architecture or by finding a new 
way of exploitation. These are some of the reasons that justi-
fy the need to follow the defense-in-depth paradigm [32] and 
fix all the code constructs that may originate a vulnerability, 
either with a known exploitation path or not. 
C. Lessons learned 
Although the number of downloads of the plugins ana-
lyzed is quite high (more than 11 million), the results pre-
sented cannot be easily generalized, as the set of plugins may 
not be representative of the collection of plugins developed 
for all the existing web applications. They may not even be 
representative of WordPress plugins, at least quantitatively. 
There are, however, qualitative reasons to believe that key 
security problems in wide spread web applications are due to 
plugins and not to the core web application, and this is also 
shown by other studies [5][22]. In fact, one major conclusion 
is that web plugin developers need to improve the security of 
their plugins, by following best practices for security. 
Another important aspect is that many large web applica-
tions are developed using OOP (see TABLE I for the Top 5) 
and there should be more PHP static code analyzers prepared 
for it. This is confirmed by the observation that a tool not 
prepared for OOP, as expected, does not perform well in an 
OOP environment, leaving many vulnerabilities undetected. 
Also, we see the need to use several detection tools in order 
to increase the overall coverage of the vulnerabilities, which 
is again in line with other studies [21]. In practice, current 
PHP static analysis tools need to be improved and, besides 
targeting generic PHP vulnerabilities, they should be adapted 
(or adaptable) to the major core web application platforms. 
We are aware that even the aggregate results of both 
tools do not cover all the vulnerabilities thoroughly. Al-
though this best effort may not deliver a perfect solution for 
all the security problems, major core web applications should 
enforce a detailed security check on the plugins available. 
Even if the static code analysis tools available are not good 
enough to assure that a plugin is free of vulnerabilities, the 
security of those plugins can be hugely improved. 
As a result of our work we sent reports on the vulnera-
bilities we identified to the plugin developers and many of 
them were analyzed, according to their responses. Further-
more, as a consequence of our findings, some (or all) of the 
vulnerabilities were already fixed. In fact, from the feedback 
received, we can confirm that 14 vulnerabilities from the 
plugins Mail-subscribe-list and Funcaptcha were quickly 
fixed and new versions of the plugins are already available 
(although many others may also have been fixed without our 
knowledge). On its own, this may improve the security of 
over 71 thousand installations (value obtained from the 
downloads of the plugins) and many more users of these 
blogs. As a collateral outcome, we should add as a recom-
mendation for administrators of the various WordPress sites, 
the need to update the plugins as soon as the updates are 
released. There are lots of security fixes in the various ver-
sions of the plugins and attackers may also abuse this infor-
mation to do a differential analysis to find the vulnerabilities 
that were fixed and to develop exploits for them, which is 
indeed a common practice. 
VI. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we analyzed the security vulnerabilities of 
35 WordPress plugins using two static analysis tools: RIPS 
and phpSAFE. More than 350 XSS and SQLi previously 
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unknown vulnerabilities were detected and 14 quickly fixed 
thanks to this work. From the vulnerabilities detected, 138 
can be considered as very easy to exploit as they are directly 
related to user inputs. This confirms that plugins are a poten-
tial source for security problems even in the context of well 
tested and widely used web applications, like WordPress. 
Results also show that the effectiveness of static analysis 
tools needs to be improved, both in terms of coverage and 
false positives. Furthermore, when possible the tools should 
be tuned for the specific context of the plugins and the core 
web application being tested and not only regarding generic 
programing language constructs. This can provide more than 
the double of detection rate. Due to the high prevalence of 
vulnerabilities, the security of plugins should be enforced 
and implemented by the developers and the core application 
providers by performing static analysis before releasing the 
plugins to the public. Web site administrators should also 
update the plugins as soon as new releases are deployed. 
Future work includes the analysis of plugins of other 
common CMS and the development of a repository of CMS 
aware list of functions that can be used to configure the static 
code analyzers for their plugins.  
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